No. n-‘bto
Supreme Court, U.S
FILED In The
OCT 2 a 2022
Supreme Court ofthe United States OFFICE OF THE Cl Fax-
♦
RALAND J BRUNSON,
Petitioner,
v.
ALMA S. ADAMS, et, al.,
Respondents.
♦
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit
♦
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Raland J Brunson
Petitioner in pro se
RECEIVED
OCT 2 k 2022
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT. U.S.
1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A serious conflict exists between decisions rendered from
this Court and lower appeal courts, along with
constitutional provisions and statutes, in deciding whether
or not the trial court has jurisdiction to try the merits of
this case.
This case uncovers a serious national security breach that
is unique and is of first impression, and due to the serious
nature of this case it involves the possible removal of a
sitting President and Vice President of the United States
along with members of the United States Congress, while
deeming them unfit from ever holding office under Federal,
State, County or local Governments found within the
United States of America, and at the same time the trial
court also has the authority, to be validated by this Court,
to authorize the swearing in of the legal and rightful heirs
for President and Vice President of the United States.
In addition there are two doctrines that conflict with each
other found in this case affecting every court in this
country. These doctrines are known as the doctrine of
equitable maxim and the doctrine of the object principle of
justice. Equitable maxim created by this court, which the
lower court used to dismiss this case, sets in direct violation
of the object principle of justice also partially created by
this Court and supported by other appeal courts and
constitutional provisions.
These conflicts call for the supervisory power of this Court
to resolve these conflicts, which has not, but should be,
settled by this Court without delay.
11
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioner Raland J Brunson is an individual representing
himself and is a Plaintiff in the trial court.
The following 388 Respondents are a party to this action as
defendants in the trial court:
Named persons in their capacities as United States House
Representatives: ALMA S. ADAMS; PETE AGUILAR;
COLIN Z. ALLRED; MARK E. AMODEI; KELLY
ARMSTRONG; JAKE AUCHINCLOSS; CYNTHIA AXNE;
DON BACON; TROY BALDERSON; ANDY BARR;
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN; KAREN BASS; JOYCE
BEATTY; AMI BERA; DONALD S. BEYER JR.; GUS M.
ILIRAKIS; SANFORD D. BISHOP JR.; EARL
BLUMENAUER; LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER; SUZANNE
BONAMICI; CAROLYN BOURDEAUX; JAMAAL
BOWMAN; BRENDAN F. BOYLE; KEVIN BRADY;
ANTHONY G. BROWN; JULIA BROWNLEY; VERN
BUCHANAN; KEN BUCK; LARRY BUCSHON; CORI
BUSH; CHERI BUSTOS; G. K. BUTTERFIELD; SALUD
- CARBAJAL; TONY CARDENAS; ANDRE CARSON;
MATT CARTWRIGHT; ED CASE; SEAN CASTEN;
KATHY CASTOR; JOAQUIN CASTRO; LIZ CHENEY;
JUDY CHU; DAVID N. CICILLINE; KATHERINE M.
CLARK; YVETTE D. CLARKE; EMANUEL CLEAVER;
JAMES E. CLYBURN; STEVE COHEN; JAMES COMER;
GERALD E. CONNOLLY; JIM COOPER; J. LUIS
CORREA; JIM COSTA; JOE COURTNEY; ANGIE CRAIG;
DAN CRENSHAW; CHARLIE CRIST; JASON CROW;
HENRY CUELLAR; JOHN R. CURTIS; SHARICE
DAVIDS; DANNY K. DAVIS; RODNEY DAVIS;
MADELEINE DEAN; PETER A. DEFAZIO; DIANA
DEGETTE; ROSAL DELAURO; SUZAN K. DELBENE;
Ill
ANTONIO DELGADO; VAL BUTLER DEMINGS; MARK
DESAULNIER; THEODORE E. DEUTCH; DEBBIE
DINGELL; LLOYD DOGGETT; MICHAEL F. DOYLE;
TOM EMMER; VERONICA ESCOBAR; ANNA G. ESHOO;
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT; DWIGHT EVANS; RANDY
FEENSTRA; A. DREW FERGUSON IV; BRIAN K.
FITZPATRICK; LIZZIE LETCHER; JEFF
FORTENBERRY; BILL FOSTER; LOIS FRANKEL;
MARCIA L. FUDGE; MIKE GALLAGHER; RUBEN
GALLEGO; JOHN GARAMENDI; ANDREW R.
GARBARINO; SYLVIA R. GARCIA; JESUS G. GARCIA;
JARED F. GOLDEN; JIMMY GOMEZ; TONY GONZALES;
ANTHONY GONZALEZ; VICENTE GONZALEZ; JOSH
GOTTHEIMER; KAY GRANGER; AL GREEN; RAUL M.
GRIJALVA; GLENN GROTHMAN; BRETT GUTHRIE;
DEBRA A. HAALAND; JOSH HARDER; ALCEE L.
HASTINGS; JAHANA HAYES; JAIME HERRERA
BEUTLER; BRIAN HIGGINS; J. FRENCH HILL; JAMES
A. HIMES; ASHLEY HINSON; TREY HOLLINGSWORTH;
STEVEN HORSFORD; CHRISSY HOULAHAN; STENY H.
HOYER; JARED HUFFMAN; BILL HUIZENGA; SHEILA
JACKSON LEE; SARA JACOBS; PRAMILA JAYAPAL;
HAKEEM S. JEFFRIES; DUSTY JOHNSON; EDDIE
BERNICE JOHNSON; HENRY C. JOHNSON JR.;
MONDAIRE JONES; DAVID P. JOYCE; KAIALPI
KAHELE; MARCY KAPTUR; JOHN KATKO; WILLIAM R.
KEATING; RO KHANNA; DANIEL T. KILDEE; DEREK
KILMER; ANDY KIM; YOUNG KIM; RON KIND; ADAM
KINZINGER; ANN KIRKPATRICK; RAJA
KRISHNAMOORTHI; ANN M. KUSTER; DARIN
LAHOOD; CONOR LAMB; JAMES R. LANGEVIN; RICK
LARSEN; JOHN B. LARSON; ROBERT E. LATTA; JAKE
LATURNER; BRENDA L. LAWRENCE; AL LAWSON JR.;
BARBARA LEE; SUSIE LEE; TERESA LEGER
FERNANDEZ; ANDY LEVIN; MIKE LEVIN; TED LIEU;
IV
ZOE LOFGREN; ALAN S.LOWENTHAL; ELAINE G.
LURIA; STEPHEN F. LYNCH; NANCY MACE; TOM
MALINOWSKI; CAROLYN B. MALONEY; SEAN
PATRICK MALONEY; KATHY E. MANNING; THOMAS
MASSIE; DORIS 0. MATSUI; LUCY MCBATH; MICHAEL
T. MCCAUL; TOM MCCLINTOCK; BETTY MCCOLLUM;
A. ADONALD MCEACHIN; JAMES P. MCGOVERN;
PATRICK T. MCHENRY; DAVID B. MCKINLEY; JERRY
MCNERNEY; GREGORY W. MEEKS; PETER MEIJER;
GRACE MENG; KWEISI MFUME; MARIANNETTE
MILLER-MEEKS; JOHN R. MOOLENAAR; BLAKE D.
MOORE; GWEN MOORE; JOSEPH D. MORELLE;
SETH MOULTON; FRANK J. MRVAN; STEPHANIE N.
MURPHY; JERROLD NADLER; GRACE F.
NAPOLITANO; RICHARD E. NEAL; JOE NEGUSE; DAN
NEWHOUSE; MARIE NEWMAN; DONALD NORCROSS;
ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ; TOM O’HALLERAN;
ILHAN OMAR; FRANK PALLONE JR.; JIMMY
PANETTA; CHRIS PAPPAS; BILL PASCRELL JR.;
DONALD M. PAYNE JR.; NANCY PELOSI; ED
PERLMUTTER; SCOTT H. PETERS; DEAN PHILLIPS;
CHELLIE PINGREE; MARK POCAN; KATIE PORTER;
AYANNA PRESSLEY; DAVID E. PRICE; MIKE
QUIGLEY; JAMIE RASKIN; TOM REED; KATHLEEN M.
RICE; CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS; DEBORAH K.
ROSS; CHIP ROY; LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD; RAUL
RUIZ; C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER; BOBBY L.
RUSH; TIM RYAN; LINDA T. SANCHEZ; JOHN P.
SARBANES; MARY GAY SCANLON; JANICE D.
SCHAKOWSKY; ADAM B. SCHIFF; BRADLEY SCOTT
SCHNEIDER; KURT SCHRADER; KIM SCHRIER;
AUSTIN SCOTT; DAVID SCOTT; ROBERT C. SCOTT;
TERRI A. SEWELL; BRAD SHERMAN; MIKIE
SHERRILL; MICHAEL K. SIMPSON; ALBIO SIRES;
ELISSA SLOTKIN; ADAM SMITH; CHRISTOPHER H.
V
SMITH; DARREN SOTO; ABIGAIL DAVIS
SPANBERGER; VICTORIA SPARTZ; JACKIE SPEIER;
GREG STANTON; PETE STAUBER; MICHELLE STEEL;
BRYAN STEIL; HALEY M. STEVENS; STEVE STIVERS;
MARILYN STRICKLAND; THOMAS R. SUOZZI; ERIC
SWALWELL; MARK TAKANO; VAN TAYLOR; BENNIE
G. THOMPSON; MIKE THOMPSON; DINA TITUS;
RASHIDA TLAIB; PAUL TONKO; NORMA J. TORRES;
RITCHIE TORRES; LORI TRAHAN; DAVID J. TRONE;
MICHAEL R. TURNER; LAUREN UNDERWOOD; FRED
UPTON; JUAN VARGAS; MARC A. VEASEY; FILEMON
VELA; NYDIA M. VELAZQUEZ; ANN WAGNER;
MICHAEL WALTZ; DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ;
MAXINE WATERS; BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN;
PETER WELCH; BRAD R. WENSTRUP; BRUCE
WESTERMAN; JENNIFER WEXTON; SUSAN WILD;
NIKEMA WILLIAMS; FREDERICA S. WILSON; STEVE
WOMACK; JOHN A. YARMUTH; DON YOUNG; the
following persons named are for their capacities as U.S.
Senators; TAMMY BALDWIN; JOHN BARRASSO;
MICHAEL F. BENNET; MARSHA BLACKBURN;
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL; ROY BLUNT; CORY A.
BOOKER; JOHN BOOZMAN; MIKE BRAUN; SHERROD
BROWN; RICHARD BURR; MARIA CANTWELL;
SHELLEY CAPITO; BENJAMIN L. CARDIN; THOMAS R.
CARPER; ROBERT P. CASEY JR.; BILL CASSIDY;
SUSAN M. COLLINS; CHRISTOPHER A. COONS; JOHN
CORNYN; CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO; TOM
COTTON; KEVIN CRAMER; MIKE CRAPO; STEVE
DAINES; TAMMY DUCKWORTH; RICHARD J. DURBIN;
JONI ERNST; DIANNE FEINSTEIN; DEB FISCHER;
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND; LINDSEY GRAHAM; CHUCK
GRASSLEY; BILL HAGERTY; MAGGIE HASSAN;
MARTIN HEINRICH; JOHN HICKENLOOPER; MAZIE
HIRONO; JOHN HOEVEN; JAMES INHOFE; RON
VI
JOHNSON; TIM KAINE; MARK KELLY; ANGUS S.
KING, JR.; AMY KLOBUCHAR; JAMES LANKFORD;
PATRICK LEAHY; MIKE LEE; BEN LUJAN; CYNTHIA
M. LUMMIS; JOE MANCHIN III; EDWARD J. MARKEY;
MITCH MCCONNELL; ROBERT MENENDEZ; JEFF
MERKLEY; JERRY MORAN; LISA MURKOWSKI;
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY; PATTY MURRAY; JON
OSSOFF; ALEX PADILLA; RAND PAUL; GARY C.
PETERS; ROB PORTMAN; JACK REED; JAMES E.
RISCH; MITT ROMNEY; JACKY ROSEN; MIKE
ROUNDS; MARCO RUBIO; BERNARD SANDERS; BEN
SASSE; BRIAN SCHATZ; CHARLES E. SCHUMER; RICK
SCOTT; TIM SCOTT; JEANNE SHAHEEN; RICHARD C.
SHELBY; KYRSTEN SINEMA; TINA SMITH;
DEBBIE STABENOW; DAN SULLIVAN; JON TESTER;
JOHN THUNE; THOM TILLIS; PATRICK J. TOOMEY;
HOLLEN VAN; MARK R. WARNER; RAPHAEL G.
WARNOCK; ELIZABETH WARREN; SHELDON
WHITEHOUSE; ROGER F. WICKER; RON WYDEN;
TODD YOUNG; JOSEPH ROBINETTE BIDEN JR in his
capacity of President of the United States; MICHAEL
RICHARD PENCE in his capacity as former Vice President
of the United States, and KAMALA HARRIS in her
capacity as Vice President of the United States and JOHN
and JANE DOES 1-100.
Vll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED…………
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
1
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS Vll
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Vlll
LIST OF PROCEEDINGS 1
JURISDICTION 1
SUPREME COURT RULE 14(F) PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE………………………. …
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION .
1
3
8
CONCLUSION 9
APPENDIX
10th CIRCIUT ORDER AND JUDGMENT ,..App. 1
App. 11
App. 29
App. 30
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT
TRIAL COURT ADOPTING REPORT
TRIAL COURT REPORT
App. 35
App. 55
AND RECOMMENDATION
OPPOSITION TO DISMISS
Vlll
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
U.S. CONSTITUTION
1, 5, App. 17
… 2, App. 15
Amendment I……………………………………………
Amendment IX………………………………………….
Amendment V…………………………………………..
Amendment XII………………………………………..
Amendment XIV………………………………………
Article 1 Section 11……………………………………
Article III…………………………………………………
Declaration of Independence – Clause 1 & II
2
3, App. 25
2, App. 25
2
App. 14, 17, 21
14
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I Section 3 3
STATUTES
18 U.S. Code § 2381.
28 U. S. C. § 2101(e)
28 U.S.C.A. §1257(a)
6, App. 9
4
1
CASES
American Bush u. City Of South S, 2006 UT 40…. 5, App. 16
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247……………….. App. 21
Determination OfRights To Use Of Water,
2008 UT 25 182 P.3d 362…………………… .. App. 13
5, App. 9
Radioshack Corp. v. ComSmart, Inc., 222 SW 3d.. 5,App. 19
Rector v. City and County ofDenver, 348 F. 3d 935.. App. 22
State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, 282 P.3d 998
Morris v. House, 32 Tex. 492 (1870)
App. 13
RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)..
Rule 11 Supreme Court
App. 2
1,4
1
LIST OF PROCEEDINGS
- Raland JBrunson v. Alma S. Adams, et al., No. 1:21-
cv-00111-CMR, U.S. District Court for the District of
Utah. Judgment entered February 2, 2022. - Raland JBrunson v. Alma S. Adams, No. 22-4007,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judgment entered October 6, 2022.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is found under 28 U.S.C.A. §1257(a)
“Final judgments…rendered by the highest court of
a State…may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by
writ of certiorari…where any…right [or] privilege…is
specially set up or claimed under the…statutes
of…the United States.”
SUPREME COURT RULE 14(F) PROVISIONS
Amendment I of the Constitution of the United States:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting . . . the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.”
Article VI of the Constitution. “This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made Pursuance
thereof; . . .shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”
2
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States; . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” Section 3: “No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any state, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
state, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.”
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution: “No
person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . .”
Ninth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States;
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.”
Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah; “No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.”
Article 1 Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah; “All courts
shall be open . . .which shall be administered without
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party.”
♦
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is against 388 federal officers in their official
capacities which include President Joseph Robinette Biden
Jr, Vice President Kamala Harris, Speaker of the House
Nancy Pelosi and former Vice President Michael Richard
Pence (“Respondents”). All the Respondents have taken the
required Oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
United States of America against all enemies, foreign and
domestic, and as such they are liable for consequences
when they violate the Oath of Office.
Respondents were properly warned and were requested to
make an investigation into a highly covert swift and
powerful enemy, as stated below, seeking to destroy the
Constitution and the United States,
purposely thwarted all efforts to investigate this,
whereupon this enemy was not checked or investigated,
therefore the Respondents adhered to this enemy. Because
of Respondents intentional refusal to investigate this
enemy, Petitioner Raland J Brunson (“Brunson”) brought
this action against Respondents because he was seriously
personally damaged and violated by this action of
Respondents, and consequently this action unilaterally
violated the rights of every citizen of the U.S.A. and
perhaps the rights of every person living, and all courts of
law.
Respondents
On January 6, 2021, the 117th Congress held a proceeding
and debate in Washington DC (“Proceeding”).
Proceeding was for the purpose of counting votes under the
2020 Presidential election for the President and Vice
President of the United States under Amendment XII.
During this Proceeding over 100 members of U.S. Congress
claimed factual evidence that the said election was rigged.
The refusal of the Respondents to investigate this
congressional claim (the enemy) is an act of treason and
This
4
fraud by Respondents. A successfully rigged election has
the same end result as an act of war; to place into power
whom the victor wants, which in this case is Biden, who, if
not stopped immediately, will continue to destroy the
fundamental freedoms of Brunson and all U.S. Citizens and
courts of law.
Due to the fact that this case represents a national security
breach on a unprecedented level like never before seen
seriously damaging and violating Brunson and coincidently
effects every citizen of the U.S.A. and courts of law.
Therefore, Brunson moves this court to grant this petition,
or in the alternative without continuing further, order the
trial court to grant Brunson’s complaint in its fullest.
Brunson’s complaint is the mechanism that can
immediately remove the Respondents from office without
leaving this country vulnerable without a President and
Vice President.
Despite the grave importance of this case, the trial court
granted Respondents motion to dismiss (“Motion”) by
stating “IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff
Raland Brunson’s action is dismissed without prejudice”.
(“Order”) This Order followed the trial court’s order to
adopt its report and recommendation that Brunson did not
get until close to the beginning of Oct. 2022 thus
prejudicing Brunson from timely filing any objections, and
the Order did not properly address Brunson’s opposition to
the Motion. Brunson’s opposition clearly shows that
Brunson has standing.
Per Brunson’s opening brief and as outlined in Brunson’s
said opposition (both not properly addressed by the lower
courts) Brunson’s has standing and the trial court has full
proper jurisdiction to rule on the merits of this case based
upon the following factors:
5
a) The case of American Bush v. City Of South Salt Lake,
2006 UT 40 140 P.3d. 1235 clearly states that the
Constitution of the United States along with State
Constitutions do not grant rights to the people. These
instruments measure the power of the rulers but they do
not measure the rights of the governed, and they are not
the fountain of law nor the origin of the people’s rights, but
they have been put in place to protect their rights.
Therefore the statutes and case law cited by Respondents
claiming immunity from Brunson’s claims in this instance
are unconstitutional and this Court needs to rule in that
manner.
b) “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people.” Therefore, the purpose of the Constitution
was written to protect our self evident rights.
Constitution cannot be construed by any means, by any
legislative, judicial and executive bodies, by any court of
law to deny or disparage our rights. This is the supreme
law of the land. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made Pursuance thereof; . .
shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby.” Article VI of the
Constitution.
The
c) The First Amendment of the Constitution states that
Congress shall make no law prohibiting the right of the
people to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
d) “Our courts have consistently held that fraud vitiates
whatever it touches, Morris v. House, 32 Tex. 492 (1870)”.
Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 SW 2d 806.
And “”It is a stern but just maxim of law that fraud vitiates
everything into which it enters.” Veterans Service Club v.
Sweeney. 252 S.W.2d 25. 27 (Kv.1952).” Radioshack Cory,
v. ComSmart, Inc., 222 SW 3d 256.
6
Vitiate; “To impair or make void; to destroy or annul, either
completely or partially, the force and effect of an act or
instrument.”
edition 2.
West’s Encyclopedia of American Law,
e) Due to the uniqueness of this case, the trial court does
have proper authority to remove the Respondents from
their offices under 18 U.S. Code § 2381 which states
“Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war
against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid
and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty
of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not
less than five years and fined under this title but not less
than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office
under the United States.” A court adjudicating that the
Respondents, who have taken the Oath of Office, to be
incapable of holding their offices or who have adhered to a
domestic enemy, means nothing without such removal of
office.
Under the stated factors Brunson has an unfettered right
to sue the Respondents under the serious nature of his
claim, no legislation can measure Brunson’s right to sue the
Respondents. Furthermore, Brunson’s allegations against
Respondents’ adhering to a domestic enemy, and
committing acts of fraud are not protected by any kind of
legislation of jurisdictional immunity. Essentially, acts of
Congress cannot protect fraud, nor protect the violation of
the Oath or that give aid and comfort to enemies of the
United States Constitution or America as alleged in
Brunson’s complaint against the Respondents. These are
facts that cannot be overcome, therefore, Brunson found no
need to include in this petition a copy of Respondents’
opposition to Brunson’s opening brief or any of their
arguments. Nevertheless, Brunson’s opening brief does
touch upon Respondents’ immunity arguments and shows
7
how Respondents do not, nor can they, overcome Brunson’s
arguments as stated herein.
It is an uncontestable fact that the Respondents committed
fraud and treason breaching our national security (as
factually alleged in Brunson’s complaint), thus adhering to
an domestic enemy that continues to breach our national
security at an alarming rate on a daily basis. This national
security breach is having the same end result as an act of
war; to place into power whom the Respondents want,
which is Biden.
powers, to order the trial court of this case to immediately
grant to Brunson the damages he seeks in his complaint.
This is necessary to immediately secure our national
security without any further delay.
Brunson moves this Court, with its
Turning now to the doctrine of equitable maxim created by
this Court, this doctrine stands in direct conflict of the
doctrine of the object principle ofjustice.
The doctrine of the object principle of justice is couched by
the supreme law of the land, and sets in motion to provide
our court system to be the most just, limited, highly
effective and easy to understand, and infuses our court
system to be the most highly respected and dearly admired
court system greater than the world has ever seen. The
doctrine of equitable maxim kills this and had the trial
court been guided by the object principle of justice this
appeal would not be necessary.
In addition, the doctrine of the object principle of justice
stops the precarious nature of our courts, their jobs would
be much easier with less stress, and parties in court would
have a strong sense on how the court is going to rule thus
promoting settlements to high degree and as such, lawsuits
and appeals would be greatly reduced. This is an absolute
fact.
8
Jurisprudence requires this Court to revoke the doctrine of
equitable maxim that it created and to instill the doctrine
of the object principle of justice more thoroughly
throughout the entire court system in America.
The doctrines of equitable maxim and the object principle of
justice are fully explained in a petition before this court
under docket No. 18-1147. To avoid being repetitious,
Brunson herein incorporates the argument found therein
as though fully stated herein and moves this court to
address the question either under this petition or docket
No. 18-1147.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION
Brunson’s complaint alleges fraud, violations of the Oath of
Office and touches on acts of treason committed by the
Respondents. These serious offenses need to be addressed
immediately with the least amount of technical nuances of
the law and legal procedures because these offenses are
flowing continually against Brunson’s liberties and life and
consequently is a continual national security breach.
Voting is the greatest power an individual can exercise in a
Republic; it is Brunson’s personal voice and the way he can
protect his personal constitutional protected rights and the
U.S. Constitution. See ^ 71 of the Complaint. When the
allegations of a rigged election came forward the
Respondents had a duty under law to investigate it or be
removed from office.
An honest and fair election can only be supported by legal
votes, this is sacred. It is the basis of our U.S. Republican
Form of Government protected by the U.S. Constitution.
The efforts made, as stated in the complaint, that avoided
an investigation of how Biden won the election, is an act of
9
treason and an act of levying war against the U. S.
Constitution which violated Brunson’s unfettered right to
vote in an honest and fair election and as such it wrongfully
invalidated his vote.
As a national security interest, Brunson moves this court to
be swift by going beyond granting this petition, it should
order the lower court to grant Brunson’s complaint to avoid
any further delay.
CONCLUSION
This petition is set forth in the interest of justice in
protecting Brunson’s right to petition for a redress of
grievances against the Respondents, and ensuring his right
of due process against the encroachment of the doctrine of
equitable maxim, and charging the Respondents who failed
to investigate the allegations of a rigged election by having
them removed from office without further delay.
Dated: October 13, 2022
Respectfully submitted,
Is/ Raland JBrunson
Raland J Brunson
4287 South Harrison Blvd., Apt 132
Ogden, Utah 84403
Phone: 385-492-4898
Petitioner in pro se














Abolish Seditious Conspiracy Laws, by Ryan McMaken
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Home | Wire | Abolish Seditious Conspiracy Laws
Abolish Seditious Conspiracy Laws
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TAGS U.S. History
12/02/2022Ryan McMaken
On Tuesday, a District of Columbia jury convicted Stewart Rhodes and Kelly Meggs of seditious conspiracy in relation to the January 6, 2021 riot at the US Capitol building. Three other defendants were acquitted of seditious conspiracy but convicted of other felonies. Convictions of seditious conspiracy represent a political victory—not just a legal one—for those who have long insisted that the January 6 riot was no mere riot, but an organized armed rebellion of some sort. This claim has been key in the administration’s ongoing vague claim that “democracy”—however defined—is somehow “at risk.”
Yet, few of the legal proceedings arising out of the Justice Department’s prosecutions of rioters have done much to forward this narrative. Out of the approximately 850 people charged with crimes of various sorts, only a small number have been charged with anything close to treason or violent insurrection. Specifically, the closest the Justice Department has come is the charge of “seditious conspiracy” applied to 11 defendants total. So far, only 2 have been convicted of the charge.
Seditious conspiracy must not be confused with the act of treason legally defined in the US Constitution, however. Generally speaking, while treason requires an overt act of some kind, seditious conspiracy is a charge that a person has said things designed to undermine government authority. In other words, it is a “crime” of intent as interpreted by state authorities. This is fundamentally different from picking up a weapon and using it against agents of a government.
Of course, as we’ve noted here at mises.org before, the very idea of treason is itself problematic since it assumes that violence against a government agent is somehow worse than a crime against a private citizen. Governments love this double standard because it reinforces the idea that the regime is more important than the voluntary private sector. Ultimately, however, violence against a person or property should be prosecuted as exactly that, and not as some separate category of crime against the “special” human beings who work for a regime.
Seditious conspiracy suffers from this same problem but is even more problematic because it relies primarily on circumstantial evidence to “prove” that a person was saying things in favor of obstructing or overthrowing a government. Indeed, the supposed necessity of such a “crime” is belied by the fact that so such crime even existed in federal law between the repeal of the hated Alien and Sedition Acts, and the advent of the Civil War. Nor did seditious conspiracy laws play an important role in the US regime’s military success against the secessionists in the Southern Confederacy.
Instead, what we find is that seditious conspiracy is a crime that is both prone to abuse by state authorities and is unnecessary in terms of preventing violence to life and property. In cases such as the January 6 riot, crimes against persons and property ought to simply be considered violent crimes and property crimes of the usual sort. Contrary to absurd romantic notions that the January 6 rioters struck some sort of blow against “democracy” the fact is that any disruptions against Congressional proceedings can be addressed as assault, trespassing, and other related crimes. Seditious conspiracy, in contrast is merely a type of “thoughtcrime.”
The Origins of Seditious Conspiracy
When the framers of the United States constitution wrote the document’s text, they defined treason in very specific and limiting terms:
Note the use of the word “only” to specify that the definition of treason shall not be construed as something more broad than what is in the text. As with much of what we now find in the Bill of Rights, this text stems from fears that the US federal government would indulge in some of the same abuses that had occurred under the English crown, especially in the days of the Stuart monarchs. Kings had often construed “treason” to mean acts, thoughts, and “conspiracies” far beyond the act of actually taking up arms against the state. Instead, in the US constitution, the only flexibility given to congress is in determining the punishment for treason.
Naturally, those who favored greater federal power chafed at these limitations and sought more federal laws that would punish alleged crimes against the state. It only took the Federalists ten years to come up with the Alien and Sedition Acts which stated:
Note the references to “intent,” “counsel,” and “advise” as criminal acts so long as these types of speech are employed in a presumed effort to obstruct government officials. This part of the Act however, was never used by the regime. Those prosecuted under the Alien and Sedition Acts were charged under the section on seditious libel which were heartily opposed for being obviously and blatantly against basic rights of free expression. Nonetheless, the Sedition Act was allowed to expire thanks to the election of Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans (later known as Democrats).
For sixty years, the United States government had no laws addressing sedition on the books. But the heart of the 1798 Sedition Act would be revived. As passed on July 1861, the new Seditious Conspiracy statute stated
Given the timing of the legislation—i.e., in 1861 following the secession of several southern states—it is assumed the origins of the legislation at the time was in addressing alleged Confederate treason. This is not quite the case. Indeed, the legislation enjoyed considerable support from those who were especially militant in their opposition to the confederacy. For example, Rep. Clement Vallandigham of Ohio—who would later be exiled to the Confederacy for opposing the war—supported the bill precisely because he thought it would help in punishing those engaged in “conspiracies to resist the fugitive slave law.” Indeed, the Congress had initially become serious about punishing “conspiracies” not in response to southern secession, but in response to John Brown’s 1859 raid in Harper’s Ferry.1
Southern secession and fears of rebellion helped enlarge the coalition in favor of a new sedition law. The new sedition law represented a significant expansion of the idea of “crimes against the state” in that the sedition law did not require overt acts against the government, but merely “conspiring” vaguely defined. Douglas understood this perfectly well, explaining the benefits of his bill as such:
Others were more suspicious of expanding federal power in this way, however. Sen. Lazarus Powell and eight other Democrats presented a statement opposing the passage of the bill.2 Specifically, Powell and his allies believed the new seditious conspiracy law would be a de facto move in the direction of allowing the federal government to effectively expand the definition of treason offered by the federal constitution. The statement read:
Even worse, the new legislation would provide to the federal government “the utmost latitude to prosecutions founded on personal enmity and political animosity and the suspicions as to intention which they inevitably engender.”
Seditious conspiracy legislation gives the federal government far greater leeway to punish political opponents. Certainly, such legislation could have indeed been used against opponents of the fugitive slave acts, as well as against opponents of federal conscription. After all, opponents of both the Civil War draft and the Vietnam War draft—as with the heroic draft-card burnings of the Catonsville Nine, for example—”conspired” to destroy government property. It would be far harder to prove in court that such acts constituted treason. Unfortunately, the new legislation was ultimately approved in 1861, and the United States government had its first permanent laws against seditious conspiracy.
We now have the same reasons to fear seditious conspiracy laws as Powell did in 1861. Such measures allow the federal government to construct laws addressing intent, thoughts, and words, rather than overt acts. This greatly expands federal power and allows for prosecution of mere inflammatory rhetoric against the federal government. Indeed, prior to his conviction this week, Rhodes’s attorneys reminded jurors that Rhodes never even entered the capital on January 6. They also noted that Rhodes had expressed verbal opposition to entering the capital. Yet, he was apparently convicted because “conspiracy” can encompass so many acts, especially in the minds of jurors.
A common-sense foundation for addressing violence in the Capitol building, however, would be to simply prosecute those who engage in actual violence and trespass. It is clear, however, that gaining convictions for seditious conspiracy has been an important goal for the administration because it assists in the narrative that Donald Trump’s supporters attempted some sort of coup. Unfortunately, These sorts of political prosecutions are just the sort of thing we’ve come to expect from the Justice Deptrtment. While the FBI can’t be bothered with investigating sex criminals such as Larry Nassar, they’ll pull out all the stops to prosecute hundreds of those who entered the Capitol on January 6, many of whom simply stood around gawking at the scenery. But when Congress gives the FBI a near carte blanche as it has done with seditious conspiracy laws, we should expect as much.
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Ryan McMaken (@ryanmcmaken) is a senior editor at the Mises Institute. Send him your article submissions for the Mises Wire and Power and Market, but read article guidelines first. Ryan has a bachelor’s degree in economics and a master’s degree in public policy and international relations from the University of Colorado. He was a housing economist for the State of Colorado. He is the author of Commie Cowboys: The Bourgeoisie and the Nation-State in the Western Genre.
Note: The views expressed on Mises.org are not necessarily those of the Mises Instit